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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 63-46(b)-16 and 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing properly revoked Petitioner's license to practice as a 
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Judicial Review of 
an Order of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah (the 
"Division") revoking Petitioner's license to practice as a 
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah. The administrative action 
against Petitioner's nursing license was filed with the Division 
on or about May 4, 1989, and the matter came on for 
administrative hearing on September 21-23, 1989, before the 
Nursing Board, with the Honorable J. Steven Eklund, 
Administrative Law Judge, presiding. On October 25, 1989 the 
Division issued an Order adopting the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order of the Nursing Board, 
The Order revoked Petitioner's license to practice as a 
Registered Nurse in the State of Utah. From this Order the 
Petitioner has filed this Petition for Judicial Review. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following Statement of Facts is taken verbatim from 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order 
issued by the Nursing Board after hearing. Citations to the 
record have been added to the Board's facts, 
1. Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these 
proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a registered nurse 
in the State of Utah, Respondent has been so licensed for 
approximately fifteen years and has been employed a registered 
nurse at various facilities during that time. As relevant 
herein, Respondent was employed at Pioneer Valley Hospital from 
September 17, 1987 until July 2, 1988. During the course of that 
employment, Respondent initially worked on the psychiatric unit 
and, later, in the emergency room. Respondent was subsequently 
employed at the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry from 
September 11, 1988 until October 12, 1988. (Amended Petition at 
paragraphs 2, 3a; Answer to Amended Petition at paragraph 1, Tr. 
at pp. 505, 447-48, 358; Div, Ex. 7, 12). 
2. On March 2, 1988, a patient, referred to herein as 
Jane Doe, was admitted to the psychiatric unit at Pioneer Valley 
Hospital with a diagnosis of multiple personality disorder, 
accompanied by depression with self-harm ideation, D.G., a 
clinical social worker, had provided treatment for Ms. Doe since 
July 1987 and D,P,, a marriage and family therapist, had provided 
psychotherapy treatment for her since December 1987. (Tr. at pp. 
24, 31, 132, 281-83, Resp. Ex. 1). 
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3. During Mrs. Doe's hospitalization, which continued 
until April 15, 1988, Respondent worked three days per week and 
provided nursing care to Mrs. Doe. Respondent was present during 
some psychiatric sessions conducted with Mrs. Doe by either J.L. 
her admitting psychiatrist, or D.P. Respondent frequently 
provided care to Mrs. Doe following her numerous psychiatric 
sessions. In so doing, he often conversed with some of her other 
personalities and reviewed videotapes with her of the sessions 
which had been conducted. (Tr. at pp. 31-33, 136-39, 226, 262, 
527) . 
4. Other members of the nursing staff on the 
psychiatric unit also provided care to Mrs. Doe, although those 
staff members were not inclined to provide as much care for her 
as did Respondent. During the course of Mrs. Doe's 
hospitalization, Respondent spent increasingly more time with 
her. He periodically received telephone calls from Mrs. Doe at 
his home when she was hospitalized. On occasions, Respondent 
would return to the hospital in response to either those calls or 
upon contact from other nursing personnel. (Tr. at pp. 437-47, 
486-90). 
5. In mid-March 1988, hospital nursing administrators 
cautioned Respondent and another nurse (S.H.) as to the excessive 
time they had spent in intervention work with Mrs. Doe and 
instructed them not to be as involved with her during such work. 
Respondent and S. H. were also instructed to coordinate their 
future activities with Mrs. Doe through her admitting 
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psychiatrist, marriage and family therapist and clinical social 
worker. (Tr. at pp. 490-93; Div. Ex. 6). 
6. Respondent continued to work extensively with Mrs. 
Doe and, on April 8 and April 10, 1988, he neglected to provide 
adequate care for other patients as a result. On April 14, 1988, 
nursing administrators counseled Respondent in that regard, yet 
he again neglected other patients while providing care to Mrs. 
Doe during the last four hours of his shift on April 14, 1988. 
The following day, Respondent was ordered to cease intervention 
work with Mrs. Doe and she became noticeably upset when he 
advised her that he would be on leave of absence from his 
employment on the psychiatric unit at the hospital. (Tr. at pp. 
460,487-93; Div. Ex. 6). 
7. On April 15, 1988, Mrs. Doe was discharged from the 
hospital with the expectation that she would resume out-patient 
treatment with her marriage and family therapist and her clinical 
social worker. S.H. contacted Respondent, who was not on duty at 
the time, and informed him that Mrs. Doe was being discharged. 
Respondent arrived at the hospital and, accompanied by one of his 
children and S.H., Respondent took Mrs. Doe to his residence to 
provide her with continuous supervision. Respondent had 
previously informed his wife and children of Mrs. Doe's 
psychiatric condition. (Tr. at pp. 152-53, 159, 294, 308, 381-83, 
464-66, 501). 
8. A few days latei:, Respondent and Mrs. Doe left his 
residence and, from late-April through May 1988, Respondent 
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resided with Mr. and Mrs. Doe at their apartment. On two 
occasions during the just-stated time, Respondent accompanied Mr. 
and Mrs. Doe to Southern Utah to visit with Mrs. Doe's parents. 
Respondent took Mrs. Doe to sessions with D.P. and, thereafter, 
periodically reviewed videotapes of those sessions with Mrs. Doe. 
Respondent often conversed with Mrs. Doe's other personalities 
and, on certain occasions, assisted her to draw out those 
personalities for some of her friends and acquaintances. (Tr. at 
pp. 43, 155-61, 239, 394, Div. Ex 5). 
9. On May 16, 1988, Respondent met with D.P., Mrs. 
Doe's marriage and family therapist, and D.G., her clinical 
social worker. The therapist advised Respondent that his 
(Respondent's) involvement with Mrs. Doe was not as a clinician 
under D.P.'s supervision, control or responsibility. D.P. also 
advised Respondent that he (the therapist) did no condone 
Respondent's living with Mr. and Mrs. Doe and that his 
(Respondent's) behavior was interfering with the therapeutic 
process. D.P. requested that Respondent act to eliminate that 
problem. Respondent denied any sexual involvement with Mrs. Doe 
at that time. (Tr. at pp. 39-43, 470, Div. Ex. 2). 
10. After May 1988, Respondent and Mr. and Mrs. Doe 
relocated and, from June 1988 until mid-July 1988, they lived at 
Respondent's residence. Depending on their work schedules, 
either Respondent or Mr. Doe were present with Mrs. Doe on a 
continuous basis during the three months which they resided 
together. Respondent had no contract with Mr. and Mrs. Doe to 
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provide home nursing care of the latter. However, based on the 
more credible evidence presented, the care which Respondent 
provided to Mrs. Doe from mid-April 1988 until mid-July 1988 was 
substantially similar to the care he had provided to her during 
her hospitalization. (Tr. at pp. 157-62, 231-33, 261-62, 270-
77, 385-87, 391-95). 
11. On a number of occasions from mid-April until mid-
July 1988, Respondent and Mrs. Doe had sexual intercourse. It 
cannot be concluded that any such conduct necessarily occurred 
while Mrs. Doe was hospitalized. However, she became pregnant as 
a result of intercourse with Respondent which would have occurred 
either immediately prior to her discharge from Pioneer Valley 
Hospital or within one week thereafter. During a therapy session 
on July 14, 1988, D.P. became aware, through one of Mrs. Doe's 
other personalities, that there had been sexual contact between 
Mrs. Doe and Respondent. D.P., who had advised Mr. and Mrs. Doe 
after they were married in mid-February 1988 that her therapy 
would be complicated by a pregnancy, subsequently became aware 
that Mrs. Doe was pregnant. (Tr. at pp. 44, 50-52, 163-66, 222-
30, 400-02, 407-09, 425-32, 559). 
12. Based on the more credible evidence presented, and 
due to her multiple personality disorder, Mrs. Doe was not 
consciously aware of her prior sexual conduct with Respondent 
until shortly before July 14, 1988. Within 1-2 days after the 
July 14, 1988 therapy session, Mrs. Doe advised her husband of 
the sexual conduct which had occurred with Respondent and Mr. and 
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Mrs. Doe ceased living with Respondent. (Tr. at pp. 43-45, 163-
66, 237-38). 
13. On October 3, 1988, a patient, referred to herein 
as Sally Smith, was admitted to the Western Institute of 
Neuropsychiatry with a diagnosis of multiple personality 
disorder. Her admitting psychiatrist, M.R., had provided 
treatment for her since late-summer 1988 and Ms. Smith had been 
previously hospitalized at the Western Institute of 
Neuropsychiatry under his care. (Tr. at pp. 320-21, 327, 344-
45). 
14. During Ms. Smith's hospitalization from October 3-
13, 1988, Respondent was not authorized by either M.R. or anyone 
else to provide psychiatric nursing care for Ms. Smith, although 
Respondent frequently spent time with her and failed to perform 
certain assigned responsibilities respecting other patients as a 
consequence. Respondent also visited Ms. Smith at the Institute 
during non-working hours. Ms. Smith discussed her psychiatric 
condition with Respondent and he was aware that she had certain 
child personalities. Ms. Smith also informed her psychiatrist, 
M.R., as to the amount to time Respondent spent with her and that 
he had given her some candy and a teddy bear. (Tr. at pp. 322-
25, 345-49, 354, 358-65, Div. Ex. 7). 
15. Respondent's nursing supervisor also became aware 
of his contacts with Ms. Smith. On October 10, 1988, 
Respondent's supervisor issued a corrective action notice to him, 
whereby she instructed Respondent to not deal with Ms. Smith in 
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any manner. Respondent's employment at the Western Institute of 
Neuropsychiatry terminated on October 12, 1988- Subsequent to 
Ms, Smith's discharge from the facility on October 13, 1988, she 
socialized with Respondent on a number of occasions. Respondent 
identified Mrs, Doe, by name, and discussed both her condition 
and the circumstances of his prior relationship to her with one 
of Ms. Smith's personalities. Respondent periodically spoke to 
Ms, Smith's personalities and he also presented gifts to those 
personalities. On two occasions, Ms, Smith spent the night and 
slept with Respondent, although it can not be concluded that any 
sexual intercourse occurred, (Tr, at pp. 330-33, 335, 343-57, 
Div. Ex. 7), 
16. Ms. Smith subsequently informed her psychiatrist 
of her continued contact with Respondent. On November 2, 1988, 
M,R, spoke with Respondent, expressed concern that Respondent's 
continuing contact with Ms. Smith was having a negative impact on 
her progress in therapy and advised Respondent to avoid any 
future contact with her. When Respondent's continued contact 
with Ms. Smith resulted in subsequent problems between her and 
her psychiatrist, Ms. Smith subsequently told Respondent she no 
longer wanted to see him and their relationship ended in May 
1989. (Tr, at pp. 326-33, 352-53). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On appeal Petitioner asserts two arguments; first, that 
the decision of the Nursing Board is not supported by substantial 
evidence, and second, that the Nurse Practice Act was not 
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intended to include interpersonal relationships between nurses 
and former patients. (Br. at 26) Each of these arguments is 
without merit. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by 
the Nursing Board and subsequently adopted by the Division in 
this case are completely and substantially supported by the 
testimony and other evidence contained in the record. 
Furthermore, while relationships between health care providers 
and former patients may properly form the basis of disciplinary 
action under a variety of circumstances, such a determination is 
unnecessary here where the Board found that the nurse/patient 
relationship that existed between Petitioner and Jane Doe never 
clearly ceased during the three months he resided with her after 
her discharge from the hospital. Petitioner's behavior toward 
Ms. Smith and Mrs. Doe, both inside the hospital and thereafter, 
constituted unprofessional conduct as defined by rule and 
statute, and, as the Board and the Division determined, fully 
justified revocation of Petitioner's nursing license. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ENTERED BY THE NURSING BOARD AND ADOPTED 
BY THE DIVISION IN THIS CASE ARE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act governs judicial review of formal 
adjudicated proceedings of administrative agencies in this State. 
That section provides in relevant part as follows: 
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The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court[.] 
Commenting upon this "substantial evidence" test, this 
court stated, in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 7 76 P.2d 
63 (Utah App. 1989), as follows: 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 
'something less than the weight of the 
evidence*'" (Quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund 
v. Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 
(1985) and Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" 
Id. 
In applying the "substantial evidence test," 
we review the "whole record" before the 
court, and this review is distinguishable 
"from both a de novo review and the 'any 
competent evidence' standard of review." 
It is also important to note that the "whole 
record test" necessarily requires that a 
party challenging the Board's Findings of 
Fact must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence, (Citations omitted) 
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In undertaking such a review, this court will 
not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though we 
may have come to a different conclusion had 
the case come before us for de novo review. 
(Citations omitted). It is the province of 
the Board, not the appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences, (Citation omitted) 
Id. at 68 (Footnotes omitted). 
Petitioner argues that the Conclusions of Law reached 
by the Nursing Board do not meet the "substantial evidence" test. 
(Br. at 32-33) Petitioner characterizes the Conclusions of Law as 
constituting 10 "allegations", 4 of which "go beyond the scope of 
the Nurse Practice Act and nursing rules." (Br. at 32) The 
remainder of Petitioner's Brief constitutes a dubious attack on 
each of the 10 Conclusions of Law, as characterized by 
Petitioner, in an attempt to establish that the Conclusions (as 
characterized by Petitioner) are not supported by substantial 
evidence, and/or that Petitioner's conduct was not subject to 
regulation by the Nurse Practice Act and applicable rules. 
Interestingly, in attacking the Conclusions of Law reached by the 
Nursing Board, Petitioner specifically references only Findings 
of Fact Nos. 4, 6, 7, 14 and 15 as failing to meet the 
substantial evidence test. (Br. at 33-38) However, these 5 
Findings of Fact, as well as the other 11 reached by the Board, 
are supported by substantial evidence, as are the Board's 
Conclusions of Law. 
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While the 10 categories into which Petitioner seeks to 
pigeonhole the Board's Conclusions of Law do not accurately and 
Completely state the Board's entire conclusions, and at times 
ignore specific and vital portions of such conclusions, for the 
sake of this argument only, the Division will accept Petitioner's 
characterization of the Conclusions and will demonstrate that 
each is amply supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
A. Conclusions of Law 1 through 6, as Characterized 
by Petitioner, are Supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
1« Failing to provide adequate care for all patients 
by spending excessive time with Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith. (Br. at 
33-35) Contrary to Petitioner's argument that this conclusion is 
based solely upon a document appearing in Petitioner's Pioneer 
Valley employee file (Br. at 33), this conclusion is supported by 
Petitioner's own testimony (Tr. at 491-494), where Petitioner 
admits that at least portions of the Pioneer Valley report are 
correct, without specifying which parts. The Conclusion of Law 
is also supported by testimony from D.G., Mrs. Doe's treating 
social worker (Tr. at 287), and again by testimony from 
Petitioner (Tr. at 460). Additionally, the document contained in 
Petitioner's personnel file with Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
entitled "Formal and Informal Supervision and Attempts to Counsel 
Richard Heinecke", which is part of Division's Exhibit No. 6, was 
prepared by Petitioner's supervisors in the ordinary course of 
business. Thus, even if the document constituted the Board's 
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only basis for this conclusion (which it does not), it would 
provide adequate evidence to support the Board's finding. 
With respect to Petitioner's failure to provide 
adequate care for patients during his employment with the Western 
Institute of Neuropsychiatry, S.P., Petitioner's employer and 
supervisor, testified to her personal involvement in admonishing 
and ultimately discharging Petitioner, in part for leaving his 
unit with no one to give medications and no one to handle 
emergencies, and for other reasons, (Tr. at pp. 358-366). 
In sum, the record, taken as a whole, provides 
substantial evidence for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law relating to Petitioner's failure to provide adequate care for 
all patients under his care by spending excessive time with Mrs. 
Doe and Ms. Smith. 
2. Improperly providing confidential information 
regarding Jane Doe to Third Parties. (Br. at 35) This 
Conclusion of Law is supported by testimony from Petitioner (Tr. 
at pp. 501-502), and by testimony from Sally Smith (Tr. at pp. 
351-352) . 
3. Petitioner worked as a psychiatric nurse even 
though he was not licensed as such. (Br. at 35-37) Petitioner 
states he is unable to find any factual findings which support 
this conclusion. (Br. at 35) To the contrary, this conclusion 
is supported by testimony from D.P., Mrs. Doe's therapist (Tr. at 
39-42), by testimony from Mrs. Doe (Tr. at 160-161), stating that 
Petitioner told her that he was "doing therapy", and by testimony 
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from S.P., Petitioner's employer at the Western Institute of 
Neuropsychiatry (Tr. at 359-360). The recoird is also replete 
with references of Petitioner accessing various personality parts 
of Jane Doe and Sally Smith both inside the hospitals, and after 
discharge. Such conduct falls within the definition of 
psychotherapy contained in Rule R153-31-5(A)(8) of the Utah 
Administrative Code, and thus constitutes a violation of Rule 
R153-31-5(H)(4)(c), of the Utah Administrative Code as was found 
to be the case by the Board in its Conclusions of Law. 
Furthermore, Petitioner's own testimony as to the care he gave to 
both Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith clearly falls within the definition 
of psychotherapy. (Tr. at pp. 534-535). 
4/5. Petitioner should not have accepted telephone 
calls from Mrs. Doe at home. (Br. at 37) Petitioner should not 
have informed Mrs. Doe of his pending leave of absence from the 
psychiatric unit which caused her to immediately request 
discharge from the hospital. (Br. at 37-38) As to those 
Conclusions of Law listed as Nos. 4 and 5 by Petitioner, clearly 
each is set forth as an example of Respondent's "behavior which 
adversely affected the physical or psycho-social welfare of both 
Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith." (Findings and Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at p. 9). As to the former, Petitioner apparently does not 
deny the fact that he received telephone calls from Mrs. Doe. 
(Br. at 37) As to the later, substantial evidence is present 
that it was Petitioner that informed Mrs. Doe of his pending 
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leave of absence from the psychiatric unit. (Tr. at pp. 460, 
539). 
6. Petitioner spent a considerable amount of time 
with Sally Smith while she was hospitalized and provided gifts to 
her. (Br. at 38-39) This conclusion is amply supported by the 
record, as is apparently acknowledged by Petitioner. (Br. at 38-
39) Petitioner acknowledges that performing services for Ms. 
Smith during his working and off-duty hours, and providing gifts 
to her, "may not have been a good judgmental call." (Br. at 39) 
In fact, this is precisely the Board's point, and is also why 
Petitioner's actions constituted unprofessional conduct. This 
finding of fact, as with the previous two, was obviously intended 
by the Board as an example of Petitioner's, "over involvement 
with Ms. Smith." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 
9). While taken alone, such acts may not have constituted 
sufficient grounds for revocation, all of Petitioner's actions 
taken in light of the "whole record" constitute ample evidence of 
gross and egregious misconduct on Petitioner's part, justifying 
revocation of his license. 
In summary, all of the Conclusions of Law characterized 
and labeled 1 through 6 in Petitioner's Brief are amply supported 
by the record taken as a whole. As to the remaining Conclusions 
of Law, which Petitioner asserts constitute conduct outside the 
hospital and therefore, "beyond the scope of the Nurse Practice 
Act and Nursing Rules" (Br. at 32), such conclusions are amply 
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supported by record, and properly form the basis of the Board's 
determination that Petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct, 
B, The Remaining Conclusions of Law, as Characterized 
by Petitioner, are Supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
1. Petitioner improperly provided out-patient therapy 
for Mrs, Doe, (Br, at 44-45). The Board's finding that 
Respondent provided therapy for Mrs, Doe after her discharge, and 
that that therapy was substantially similar to the care he had 
provided to her during her hospitalization is amply supported by 
the record. (Tr. at pp, 394-95, 232 and 270-76). 
2. Petitioner became overly involved with Sally Smith 
after her discharge from hospitalization and had a negative 
impact upon her relationship with her psychiatrist, (Br. at 45-
46) Again, this conclusion is amply supported by evidence in the 
record, (Tr. at pp, 326-33, 352-53). 
3. Respondent improperly had sexual relations with 
Mrs. Doe without allowing sufficient lapse of time for the nurse-
patient relationship to terminate, (Br» at 45-47) This 
conclusion is supported by testimony from various individuals. 
For example, Mrs, Doe testified extensively about Petitioner 
having sexual relations with her personality parts without her 
consent, both in and out of the hospital, and about conceiving 
Mr. Heinecke's child. (Tr, at pp. 222-238). Dr. T. J. testified 
at length about the time of conception of Mrs. Doe's child, (Tr. 
at pp. 415-33). Finally, Mr. Heinecke acknowledged paternity of 
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Mrs. Doe's child. (Tr. at 559), and also testified extensively 
about his sexual relations with Mrs. Doe. (Tr. at pp. 508-11). 
The record, taken as a whole, provides substantial evidence for 
the Board's conclusion that Mrs. Doe's pregnancy as a result of 
intercourse with Mr. Heinecke occurred either immediately prior 
to her discharge from Pioneer Valley Hospital or within one week 
thereafter. Interestingly, Petitioner acknowledges in his Brief 
that, "it may have been poor judgment on the part of Petitioner 
to become romantically and sexually involved with Mrs. Doe." 
(Br. at 47) Petitioner also concludes that, "there is no rule or 
statute prohibiting poor judgment, and in light of the total 
record . . . the sexual relationship which existed between them 
cannot be used as a basis for punishment." JEcL Petitioner's 
statements are in error. There are both statutes and rules 
governing "practices which fail to conform with the accepted 
standards of the specific licensed occupational profession and 
which could jeopardize the public health, safety or welfare", 
"failing to utilize appropriate judgment in administering safe 
nursing practice", and "intentionally committing any act that 
adversely affects the physical or psycho-social welfare of the 
patient." Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2(6); Rule R153-31-6(D)(1)(16) 
of the Utah Administrative Code. Petitioner repeatedly, and in 
an abhorrent manner, violated each of these rules, and revocation 
of his license was the only appropriate sanction. 
4. Petitioner used his knowledge and skills with Jane 
Doe and Sally Smith to promote his own interest in personal 
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relationships with them. (Br. at 47-48) As Petitioner points 
out, "this charge is essentially a recap of the prior three 
allegations of improper contact with Jane Doe and Sally Smithf.]" 
(Br, at 47) Petitioner asserts that "Nurses are not machines or 
computers that can be programmed as such and unless it could be 
shown that Petitioner improperly used his nursing skills against 
these individuals then he can not be charged with misconduct." 
(Br. at 48) The facts, and the record taken as a whole, however, 
indicate that Petitioner acted in a grossly inappropriate manner 
towards two individuals whom he treated and cared for during his 
employment as a registered nurse. Such conduct is subject to the 
Nurse Practice Act, and property forms the basis for a finding 
that Petitioner committed unprofessional conduct. With respect 
to Ms. Doe, the record establishes that he accessed her various 
personality parts and, without her knowledge, approval or 
consent, carried on a sexual relationship with her that resulted 
in pregnancy and the delivery of a child. In the case of Ms. 
Smith, Petitioner engaged in inappropriate conduct by becoming 
overly involved with Ms. Smith despite being warned repeatedly 
against such conduct by his superiors. This over involvement, at 
least in part, resulted in Petitioner's termination of employment 
with the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry. The record, as a 
whole, demonstrates that Petitioner ignored counsel of his 
supervisors, and the good of patients in his care, and used 
information and skills he gained about Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith 
while they were hospitalized to his personal advantage. The most 
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blatant example of the latter being his access of Mrs. Doe's 
personality parts to have sex with her without her consent. In 
sum, this conclusion is supported by substantial (indeed 
overwhelming) evidence in the record. 
II. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS CONDUCT 
WAS NOT REGULATED BY THE NURSE PRACTICE ACT 
IS ERRONEOUS. 
Petitioner's attempt to excuse his actions by claiming 
that the Nurse Practice Act cannot control his activities after 
the two patients were discharged is incorrect, first, because the 
Board found that the nurse-patient relationship, at least in the 
case of Mrs. Doe, had not terminated, and second, because 
Petitioner repeatedly used knowledge, skills and relationships he 
acquired with respect to Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith inappropriately 
and to "promote his own interest in- personal relationships with 
them." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 10). Such 
conduct related to his practice of nursing, and thus formed a 
proper basis for sanctions. 
Petitioner argues that, "under the Nursing Practice Act 
a person ceases to become [sic] a patient as soon as compensation 
for nursing care has ceased." (Br. at 43) The implication drawn 
by Petitioner is that once a patient is discharged, nothing a 
nurse who treated that patient during hospitalization may do with 
respect to the patient can subject him to accountability for 
unprofessional conduct. Petitioner's argument is completely 
untenable, and contrary to the plain language of the statutes and 
rules involved. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-31-14 provides in relevant part: 
The Division has the power to revoke or 
suspend any license to practice nursing . . . 
if the person: 
(b) is guilty of immoral, unethical, or 
unprofessional conduct as it relates to the 
practice of nursing. (Emphasis added). 
Petitioner's immoral, unethical and unprofessional 
actions toward Ms. Smith and Mrs. Doe after each was released 
from hospitalization (in addition to those committed during 
hospitalization and toward other individuals) clearly related to 
Petitioner's practice of nursing, and thus constituted actions 
subject to the standards of the Nurse Practice Act. Petitioner 
ignores the fact that he used knowledge, skills and relationships 
developed during his care for these two psychiatric patients 
during their hospitalization to further his own sordid interests 
in them after their release. Petitioner's conduct was, 
therefore, no different than that of a nurse who might steal 
drugs while on duty and, after using the drugs at home, claim 
that such conduct cannot be subject to the Nurse Practice Act. 
The fallacy of such an argument is apparent. 
Finally, Petitioner conveniently ignores, during his 
discussion of applicability of the Nurse Practice Act (Br. at 40-
43), any reference to the Board's conclusions regarding the 
negative impact that his conduct toward Mrs. Doe and Ms. Smith 
after their hospitalization had upon their therapy, and the 
Board's findings that, at least as to Mrs. Doe, the nurse/patient 
relationship never clearly ceased while Petitioner lived with 
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Mrs. Doe after her discharge. These conclusions are completely 
and substantially supported by the record, and lend further 
illumination to the transparently flawed argument offered by 
Petitioner, that his conduct toward these patients after 
hospitalization is somehow shielded from scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the "substantial evidence" test, the record in 
this case, taken as a whole, amply supports each of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached by the Board and 
subsequently adopted by the Division, and not only supports, but 
mandates, the action taken by the Board, namely, revocation of 
Petitioner's license to practice as a registered nurse. 
DATED this off ^ day of August, 1990. 
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